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Abstract 
We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent 
rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate 
the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict.  In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with 
relatively  symmetric  conflict  capabilities  agree  to  resolve  the  conflict  by  randomization. 
However,  with  sufficiently  asymmetric  capabilities,  conflicts  are  unavoidable  because  the 
stronger  agent  prefers to fight.  Laboratory  experiments  confirm  that  the  availability  of  the 
random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are relatively symmetric; however, the 
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1.  Introduction 
In  archaic  Greece,  representatives from  powerful  city-states  would travel  to  remote 
Delphi to consult the Oracle housed at a temple dedicated to the god Apollo. The Oracle, a 
priestess believed to be possessed by Apollo, provided advice to visitors about controversial 
political matters by responding to questions that typically could be answered with a “yes” or 
“no” response, and owing partly to the Oracle’s divine connection, the city-states would abide 
by its counsel (Bowden, 2005). Iannaccone et al. (2011) argue that the purpose of the Oracle, as 
well as other forms of institutionalized divination, was to resolve problematic and potentially 
costly disputes through a multilateral commitment to the outcome of a randomization device.  
Consider a (hypothetical) dispute between Athens and Sparta over a piece of territory, 
where the alternative to abiding by the Oracle’s proposed allocation is armed conflict. In this 
context, adherence to the decision of the Oracle constitutes a surplus-preserving solution to a 
multi-player contest where agents (city-states) are relatively equally powerful. With relatively 
equal opponents, the potential cost of conflict may overwhelm the gains to deviation from the 
Oracle’s  decision.  Hence,  the  small  and  autonomous  city-states  have  a  strong  interest  in 
supporting a randomizing Oracle.  
Historically  mechanisms  of  divination  took  many  forms,  including  divining  rods,  the 
casting of lots, and the inspired interpretation of cracks in fire-heated bones or of ominous 
patterns  observed  in  other  media  ranging  from  freshly  spread  entrails  to  wafting  smoke 
(Bernstein, 1996; Bowden, 2005). Regardless of the mechanism, willingness to submit to its 2 
 
outcome can be viewed as a strategic choice to avoid potentially costly conflict.
1 More familiar 
examples of conflict resolution via random device are abundant. Rock-paper-scissors, drawing 
straws, and throwing dice settle many friendly disputes, like who gets to sit in the front seat on 
a road trip, or who gets the top bunk bed in a dorm room.  
However, even today the stakes can be high:   Recently, a judge in Florida required 
lawyers on opposing sides of a case to settle a disagreement by rock -paper-scissors, and the 
auction houses of Sotheby’s and Christie’s played the game to determine who would receive a 
contract to sell $17.8 million worth of art.
2 In some political jurisdictions, a coin flip decides the 
outcome of elections in which  two candidates receive equal numbers of votes, and in other 
jurisdictions coin flips are employed to determine the recipient of a government contract when 
two companies tender equal   offers  (Lissau, 2011).  Similarly, conflicting parties frequently 
consent to third-party arbitration (Burgess et al., 1996; Szymanski, 2003) in order to avoid the 
costs of going to court. 
Returning  to  our  example,  consider  a  situa tion  in  which  the  power  of  Sparta  is 
ascendant and that of Athens on the decline.  When  Sparta grows sufficiently strong, it no 
longer benefits from commitment to  a random device. If the gains to conflict are sufficient, 
then random decisions by the Oracle can only handcuff Sparta’s ambition.
3 Although it is clear 
why the random device may work as a  surplus-preserving commitment mechanism, it is not 
                                                 
1 Another well-known historical example of commitment to what might be considered a random device is the 
battlefield agreement to settle a conflict by single combat between two renowned warriors.  Such combat  is 
attested in myth (e.g., combat described in the Iliad between Menelaus and Paris and between Achilles and 
Hector) and numerous historical wars (e.g., the Battle of Clastidium 222 BC, the Battle of Badr 624 AD, the Battle of 
the Trench 627 AD, to name a few). Similarly, Leeson (2010) describes the medieval mechanism of “trial by battle” 
through which uncertain property rights were frequently assigned. 
2 See the following news article from the AP: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13221673/ns/us_news-weird_news/ 
3 Indeed, as Greece became a unified empire it no longer had need of the Delphic Oracle for political purposes. As 
such by the third century BCE the Oracle was used mainly for religious and personal inquiries (Bowden 2005). 3 
 
obvious why agents, committed ex ante to the result of the coin flip, would follow through on 
such a commitment after observing an ex post unfavorable decision by the random device. One 
way to ensure that agents follow the commitment can be through binding contracts, such as 
the Sotheby’s rock-paper-scissors example. In such a case, agents could sign a contract ex ante 
that  would  commit  them  ex  post  to  follow  the  result  of  the  random  device.  A  similar 
mechanism is employed in the aforementioned election and contract assignment rules (Lissau, 
2011).  
However, agents cannot always enter binding contracts. As in our historical example, it 
is unclear what would prevent Athens from rejecting the Oracle’s counsel and fighting Sparta 
anyway  if  Sparta  was  favored  by  the  decision.  Two  reasons  why  agents  committed  to  the 
Oracle’s  decisions  in  ancient  times  were  (1)  historical  context  and  the  perceived  ‘mystical’ 
nature of such decisions (Iannaccone et al., 2011), and (2) reputational concerns resulting from 
repeated  interaction  with  one  another  and  with  the  Oracle  (Dellarocas,  2006).  Similar 
reputational factors may be at work in some of the lighthearted examples of commitment to 
randomization we described above. Whether commitment to the random device mechanism is 
binding or non-binding, such mechanisms are prevalent in daily life and are often employed in 
modern economics, politics and law. 
Motivated  by  historical  awe-inspiring  examples  and  modern  mundane  practices,  we 
theoretically  and  experimentally  examine  individual  willingness  to  resolve  conflicts  by 
commitment to a random device. We alter both the availability of a random device and the 
relative strength of players in four treatments where we model conflict as a variation of the 
classic Tullock (1980) rent-seeking contest between two agents. In our setup, two agents face 4 
 
the prospect of a conflict over a valuable prize. Before the conflict arises both participants may 
agree to settle the dispute by flipping a coin (an Oracle) and thereby avoiding the costs of the 
contest. We  show analytically that if agents are relatively symmetric, then conflicts  will be 
avoided through appeals to the Oracle. However, when agents are substantially asymmetric 
then  conflicts  are  unavoidable  because  the  stronger  agent  has  no  incentive  to  consent  to 
randomization.  In  laboratory  experiments  subject  behavior  is  largely  consistent  with  the 
predictions:  the  introduction  of  a  random  commitment  device  reduces  conflict,  and  the 
reduction is significantly greater (though not complete) when agents are more symmetric. Thus, 
although the costs of conflict are not always avoided when the theory predicts that they will be, 
they are nevertheless frequently avoided when theory predicts that they will not. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  section  2,  we  briefly  review  the 
literature on conflicts and conflict resolution; in section 3 we detail our theoretical results; 
section 4 describes our experimental design, procedures and hypotheses; section 5 analyzes the 
results of the experimental sessions; and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Background 
A rich literature on conflict resolution in economics extends back to Schelling’s (1960) 
Strategy of Conflict in which he applied the tools of game theory to identify the necessity of 
credible  commitment  to  avoiding  conflict.  Since  Schelling,  economists  and  others  have 
developed  numerous  models  of  conflict,  all  of  which  highlight  the  resources  wasted  when 
conflict  occurs  (Konrad,  2009).  One  of  the  best-known  conflict  models  is  the  rent-seeking 5 
 
contest, first developed by Tullock (1980) and elaborated by Skaperdas (1996), in which agents 
expend  resources  to  increase  their  probabilities  of  winning  a  valuable  prize.  An  agent’s 
probability  of  winning  equals  his  expenditure  divided  by  the  sum  of  all  contestants’ 
expenditures, so an agent who expends more resources has a better chance of receiving the 
prize. In equilibrium, all agents make positive expenditures; however, from the point of view of 
society,  all  such  expenditures  are  wasteful.  Moreover,  laboratory  experiments  testing  this 
model indicate that in practice the costs of conflict are even higher than predicted by the 
theory (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Fonseca, 2009; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; 
Mago et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011). 
Given the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, a number of mechanisms for 
inducing commitment have been proposed, ranging from deterrence via extensive armament 
(Schelling,  1960)  and  hostage  exchange  (Williamson,  1985)  to  contractually  binding  side-
payments (Charness et al., 2007; Schoonbeek, 2009; Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2011). The 
common property of all such conflict resolution mechanisms is that they seek to alter payoffs in 
a way that eliminates the incentive for one party to unilaterally initiate conflict. In general, any 
mechanism that provides all potential combatants with an expected payoff at least as large as 
their expected payoff from conflict is preferable to outright conflict. Hence, in a dispute over an 
indivisible  resource,  random  assignment,  or  assignment  by  means  of  an  “uncorrelated 
asymmetry”,  that  is,  some  asymmetry  between  players  that  is  uncorrelated  with  their 
probabilities  of  winning  a  conflict,  e.g.  first  possession  (see  Maynard-Smith,  1982),  can  be 
supported as a Nash equilibrium. 6 
 
Here we explore the decision to employ a random device (hereafter the Oracle) to avoid 
costly  conflict  in  a  Tullock  contest.  Prior  to  the  conflict,  both  parties  can  elect  to  bind 
themselves to the decision of the Oracle. If both parties elect to adhere to the Oracle, then the 
contest prize is awarded randomly and no conflict ensues. Otherwise, if one or both of the 
parties elect not to use the Oracle, then the two parties engage in a Tullock contest to assign 
the prize. 
 
3.  The Oracle Model 
Consider a game of potential conflict between two risk-neutral players for a prize valued 
at v by both players. We define the game in two sequential stages, the Oracle stage and the 
conflict stage. In the Oracle stage, players 1 and 2 simultaneously decide whether to resolve the 
conflict by flipping a fair coin or to enter the conflict stage.
4 If both players agree to the coin 
flip, then the game ends with neither player advancing to the conflict stage. The prize is 
allocated to each player with probability p1
Oracle = p2
Oracle = 0.5, and players 1 and 2 receive the 
expected payoffs of E(π1
Oracle) = E(π2
Oracle) = v/2. However, if either player refuses to abide by 
the outcome of the coin flip, then both players advance to the conflict stage. 
In the conflict stage, both players make irreversible effort expenditures e1 and e2 to 
increase their probabilities of receiving the prize. Players have different conflict capabilities 
(strengths) ai (a1 > a2), so that the stronger player 1 can expend the same effort, yet have a 
higher chance of winning the prize. Specifically, player i’s probability of winning is defined by 
the following contest success function (Skaperdas, 1996): 
                                                 




pi(e1, e2) = aiei /(a1e1 + a2e2).                (1) 
The expected payoff for player i is equal to the probability of player i winning, pi(e1, e2), 
times the prize valuation, v, minus contest expenditure, ei: 
E(πi) = pi(e1, e2)v - ei.                  (2) 
By differentiating (2) and solving the best response functions simultaneously, we obtain 





2.           (3) 
Given the equilibrium effort expenditures (3), the probabilities of winning the contest by 
players 1 and 2 are: 
p1
* = a1/(a1+a2) and p2
* = a2/(a1+a2).             (4) 







2.          (5) 
Hence, the contest is both individually costly to the loser and socially costly because all 
conflict stage expenditures are wasted. As a result, if both players possess complete knowledge 
of the game’s structure and incentives, they may prefer to avoid the conflict stage by consulting 
the Oracle (flipping the coin).
5 In fact, the weaker player 2 will  always choose the Oracle over 






2 = v/4 < v/2 = E(π2
Oracle). However, the choice of 
player 1 crucially depends on how much stronger player 1 is than player 2. In particular, player 
1 will choose the coin flip only if E(π1
*) = va1
2/(a1+a2)
2 ≤ v/2 = E(π1
Oracle), or when a2 ≥ (√2-1)a1. 
                                                 
5 One can interpret the Oracle stage as players bargaining to determine the form of the contest success function, 
i.e. either completely noisy or lottery contest success function.  8 
 
Hence, our theory predicts that if players’ capabilities are relatively symmetric, then 
conflicts will be avoided through appeals to the Oracle.
6 However, when the asymmetry is 
substantial then conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger party will alwa ys choose to 
enter the conflict. Note that if we increase the probability that the Oracle assigns the prize to 
the stronger player, i.e. p1
Oracle > p2
Oracle, we can again create an Oracle that both players would 
prefer over conflict. Indeed, because a randomization device is always surplus-preserving, there 
exists an Oracle that would be preferred by both players for any costly conflict situation. Even if 
the Oracle itself is costly to setup or to maintain, it is preferable by both players as long as 
individual  costs  of  creating  and  maintaining  the  Oracle  are  less  than  individual  benefits  of 
avoiding  conflicts  through  the  Oracle,  i.e.  c1  ≤  E(π1
Oracle)  -  E(π1
  Conflict)  and  c2  ≤  E(π2
Oracle)  - 
E(π2
Conflict). In what follows we explore the simplest case in which the Oracle allocates the prize 
by flipping a fair coin (p1
Oracle = p2
Oracle = 0.5) and there are no costs of maintaining the Oracle (c1 
= c2 = 0). 
 
4.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
We employ four treatments to test the predictions of our theory: Baseline-Unbalanced, 
Baseline-Balanced, Oracle-Unbalanced, and Oracle-Balanced, where Unbalanced and Balanced 
refer to the relative strengths of players 1 and 2. The outline of the experimental design and the 
                                                 
6 In the relatively symmetric case, i.e. a2 ≥ (√2-1)a1, there is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which both 
players simultaneously choose not to use the Oracle. Since the use of Oracle requires unilateral agreement, if one 
player chooses not to use the Oracle then the other player might as well choose not to use it. However, it easy to 
see that such subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is not strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), and both 
players can benefit from unilaterally deviating from it. In fact, we do not find any support for this equilibrium in our 
data, as weak players almost always choose to use the Oracle.  9 
 
theoretical predictions for each treatment are shown in Table 1. In all treatments subjects 
compete for a prize with value v = 100. In the Baseline-Unbalanced treatment, players 1 and 2 
have substantially different strengths, i.e. a1 = 4 and a2 = 1. In equilibrium, the expenditures of 
players 1 and 2 are e1
* = 16 and e2
* = 16, the probabilities of winning are p1
* = 0.8 and p2
* = 0.2, 
and the expected payoffs are E(π1
*) = 64 and E(π2
*) = 4. In the Baseline-Balanced treatment, 
players 1 and 2 have relatively symmetric strengths, i.e. a1 = 3/2 and a2 = 1. In equilibrium 
players 1 and 2 expend e1
* = 24 and e2
* = 24, win the conflict with probabilities p1
* = 0.6 and p2
* 
= 0.4, and earn expected payoffs of E(π1
*) = 36 and E(π2
*) = 16. Thus, the costs of conflict are 
increasing in the relative symmetry of the players.
7 
The  other  two  treatments,  Oracle-Unbalanced  and  Oracle-Balanced  introduce  the 
Oracle stage to the game, prior to the conflict stage. In the Oracle stage, players simultaneously 
decide  whether  to  flip  a  coin  in  order  to  determine  the  winner  of  the  prize.  In  case  of 
disagreement or joint refusal to consult the Oracle, both treatments are equivalent to Baseline-
Unbalanced  and  Baseline-Balanced  treatments.  The  equilibrium  prediction  in  the  Oracle-
Unbalanced  treatment  is  that  conflict  always  occurs,  because the  stronger  player  1  always 
chooses to enter the conflict since E(π1
*) = 64 > 50 = E(π1
Oracle). On the other hand, in the 
Oracle-Balanced treatment, conflict never occurs, because both players always agree to consult 
the Oracle since E(π1
*) = 36 < 50 = E(π1
Oracle) . 
Each experimental session consisted of 30 periods of a single treatment. Subjects were 
randomly assigned the initial role of either player 1 or player 2, and each player 1 was matched 
with a player 2. Subjects remained in this role and matched pair for the first 15 periods of the 
                                                 
7 This result has long been recognized in the theoretical literature (Baik, 1994; Konrad, 2009). 10 
 
session. Then all players 1 became players 2 and vice versa, and subjects were re-matched into 
new  pairs  in  which  they  remained  for  the  final  15  periods.
8  Each period,  in the  Baseline-
Unbalanced and Baseline-Balanced treatments subjects chose their expenditures, any number 
between 0 and 100, in order to increase the probability of winning the prize of 100 francs. At 
the end of each period, the computer displayed these expenditures, as well as corresponding 
payoffs. In the Oracle-Unbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments, subjects first made their 
decisions whether to flip a computerized coin in order to determine who would receive the 
prize,  or  to  enter  the  second  stage  conflict.
9  The  computer  displayed  subjects’  first  stage 
decisions. Then, if at least one of the paired players decided not to flip  the coin, subjects 
proceeded to the second stage where they chose their expenditures. At the end of each period, 
the computer displayed individual decisions, as well as corresponding payoffs, to each subject. 
After 30 periods, subjects also participated in a one period contest in which they could 
expend resources to win a prize worth zero. This was done to elicit subjects’ non-monetary 
value  of  winning.  At  the  end  of  each  experimental  session,  subjects  completed  a  brief 
demographic  survey.  To  reinforce  the  one-shot  incentives  of  the  game,  subjects  knew 
beforehand that we would randomly select 4 of the 30 periods for payment. At the end of the 
session, subjects’ total earnings from these 4 periods less their expenditures for the zero value 
prize  were  added  to  or  subtracted  from  an  initial  endowment  of  500  francs  (which  we 
described as a participation fee). We converted francs to USD at a rate of 25 = $1, and subjects 
                                                 
8 This type of matching protocol was used to mitigate concerns about fairness and inequality among subjects. Also, 
we wanted for subjects to have sufficient experience in each role before switching to another role. Finally, we 
wanted to preserve contamination of subjects’ behavior in one session by outliers (alternatively, in a random 
matching environment the presence of several outliers could substantially impact the behavior of all subjects in 
the session). 
9 One could also design an experiment to study non-binding Oracle agreements, where in a repeated-game setting 
the loser may refuse to abide by the coin flip and instead engage in conflict. 11 
 
were paid privately in cash and dismissed from the experiment. Sessions lasted approximately 
an hour each. 
180 subjects were recruited at random from the subject pool consisting of graduate and 
undergraduate students at a private university in the United States. Subjects were randomly 
assigned into 8 experimental sessions (2 per treatment) with between 20 and 24 subjects each. 
Subjects sat at, and interacted via, visually isolated computer terminals, and instructions were 
read aloud by the experimenter as subjects followed along on paper. The experiments were 
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before participating subjects took a quiz (non-
incentivized) to confirm their understanding of the experimental procedures. Subjects received 
their initial endowments for arriving to the experiment on time and received their earnings in 
cash privately at the end of each session. The average experimental earnings, including the $20 
participation  fee,  were  $24.5,  ranging  from  a  low  of  $11.4  to  a  high  of  $35.6.  No  subject 
participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a similar experimental 
environment. Instructions for the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment are included in an appendix. 
Instructions for the other treatments are available upon request. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1.  The Impact of the Oracle on Surplus 
The  main  research  question  of  our  study  is  whether  the  availability  of  the  Oracle 
reduces the cost of conflict and increases economic surplus. Table 2 displays summary statistics 
for all four treatments. Comparing surpluses in Table 2, we find that surplus is 39% higher in the 12 
 
Oracle-Unbalanced than the Baseline-Unbalanced treatment (76.1 versus 54.8), and it is 69% 
higher  in  the  Oracle-Balanced  than  the  Baseline-Balanced  treatment  (75.8  versus  44.9).  To 
support  this  finding  statistically,  we  estimate  panel  regressions  separately  for  each  of  the 
Unbalanced  and  Balanced  treatments  where  the  dependent  variable  is  pairwise  surplus, 
defined as v - (e1 + e2) for each pair in each period, and the independent variables are a period 
trend, a dummy-variable controlling for the last 15 periods after players switch roles, and a 
dummy-variable for the presence of the Oracle. We include a random effects error structure for 
the individual subjects to account for repeated measures, which is equivalent to group random 
effects since surplus is measured at the level of the pair.  
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. Mixed evidence on the significance of the 
period trend indicates increasing surplus over time in the Unbalanced treatment, though not in 
the  Balanced  treatment.
10  The insignificant estimated effect of switching roles  reveals  the 
absence of notable re-matching effects. 
More important for our purposes, regressions (1) and (2) indicate that the effect of the 
Oracle treatment on surplus is positive and significant for both treatments (p-values < 0.01). 
However, relative to theoretical benchmarks, surplus in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment is 
significantly higher than predicted (76.1 versus 68); while in the Oracle-Balanced treatment, it is 
significantly lower than predicted (75.8 versus 100).
11 We summarize these findings in Result 1. 
                                                 
10 As we discuss further in Section 5.3, increasing surplus over time comes primarily from a decrease in strong 
player conflict expenditures over time. 
11  Separately  for  Oracle-Unbalanced  and  Oracle-Balanced  treatments,  we  estimate  random  effects  panel 
regressions in which the dependent variable is surplus and the independent variables are a constant, a period 
trend,  and  a  dummy-variable  controlling  for  switched  roles.  Wald  test  indicates  that  the  estimated  constant, 
capturing surplus, is significantly higher than predicted in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment (p-value = 0.02) and 
significantly lower than predicted in the Oracle-Balanced treatment (p-value < 0.001). 13 
 
Result 1: The Oracle increases mean surplus in both treatments. However, the surplus is 
significantly higher than predicted in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment and significantly lower 
in the Oracle-Balanced treatment. 
Does the deviation from the theory derive from the entry decisions in the Oracle stage 
or from expenditures in the conflict stage? The estimations of regressions (3) and (4) in Table 3 
provide  the  first  insight.  These  regressions  use  only  those  observations  which  resulted  in 
conflict. The estimated effect of the Oracle treatment is insignificant for both the Unbalanced 
and Balanced treatments, indicating that higher surplus in the Oracle treatments mainly comes 
from decisions not to enter the conflict; when conflict occurs in the Oracle treatments, it is 
neither more nor less intense than conflict in the Baseline treatments. In the next section we 
further  analyze  how  entry  decisions  differ  from  theoretical  predictions,  therefore  implicitly 
shaping Result 1. 
 
5.2.  Probability of a Conflict 
The primary source of deviations between observed and predicted surplus in result (1) is 
deviation from the predicted frequency of appeals to the Oracle to settle conflicts. In particular, 
Table  2  reports  that  subjects  in  the  Oracle-Balanced  treatment  employ  the  randomization 
device with probability 0.63, although the theory predicts that no conflict will occur. On the 
other hand, the Oracle-Unbalanced subjects appeal to the Oracle with probability 0.40, though 
theory predicts that they will fight with probability 1. Figure 1 displays time series of conflict 
entry probability by subject type, all of which are relatively stable over time. When conflict 
occurs, the stronger player usually instigates, and the probability of entry by strong players is 14 
 
higher  in  the  Oracle-Unbalanced  than  the  Oracle-Balanced  treatment.  Furthermore,  most 
weaker players choose not to enter conflict, regardless of their relative strength.  
To support these observations, we estimate panel probit models with random effects 
for each subject, where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a player chose to engage in 
conflict and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are a constant term, a dummy-variable for 
the weaker player 2, a period trend, and a dummy-variable controlling for switched roles after 
period 15. Table 4 reports estimation results. Insignificant estimated coefficients of the period 
trend and the role-switching dummy indicate no notable changes over time or as a result of re-
matching.
12  Consistent with  the  comparative statics predictions of the model, the weaker 
player 2 chooses to engage in a conflict significantly less often than the stronger player 1. 
However, as noted above, the overall probability of a conflict is lower than the predicted value 
of 1 in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment and higher than 0 in the Oracle-Balanced treatment 
(p-values < 0.01)
13. Table 4 reports an additional estimation combining data from the Oracle-
Unbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments (column 3). Again consistent with the comparative 
statics predictions, the Unbalanced coefficient is positive, indicating that the probability of a 
conflict increases in players’ asymmetry. We summarize these findings in Result 2. 
                                                 
12 These observations are generally robust to estimating the effects separately for each type. The slight upward 
trend in the entry probability of stronger players in the Unbalanced treatment is weakly significant (p-value = 
0.07). 
13 To test these hypotheses, we estimate two linear probability panel regressions where the dependent variable 
takes a value of 1 if a conflict occurred (i.e. if one or both members of the pair chose conflict) and a value of 0 
otherwise. The dependent variables include a period tren d and a dummy for the last 15 periods  and we include 
group specific random effects to control for repeated observations. Wald tests reject the hypothesized values of 
the constant term. Regression output is unreported but available from the authors upon request. 15 
 
Result 2: The probability of a conflict is higher when  players are more asymmetric. 
There are significantly fewer conflicts than predicted in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment and 
significantly more conflicts in the Oracle-Balanced treatment. 
These  findings  support  our  claim  that  the  divergence  between  the  observed  and 
predicted impact of the Oracle on surplus in both treatments (Result 1) can largely be traced to 
differences between the observed and predicted probabilities of conflict (Result 2). There are 
several potential explanations for why we observe “too little” conflict in the Oracle-Unbalanced 
and “too much” conflict in the  Oracle-Balanced treatment. First and most importantly, the 
predicted  probabilities  of  conflict  are  at  the  boundaries,  so  that  in  the  Oracle-Unbalanced 
treatment even one non-equilibrium choice of non-entry implies the average probability of 
conflict less than one.
14 Similarly, in the Oracle-Balanced treatment even one non-equilibrium 
choice of entry implies the average probability of conflict more than zero. Thus, deviations from 
the predictions can only be observed in one direction. 
In  addition,  one  could  offer  preference-based  explanations  of  our  observations.  For 
example, if subjects care about the (expected) payoffs of others, both inequality aversion (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and preferences for social efficiency (Charness 
and Rabin, 2002) imply a lower expected probability of conflict. Given the strength asymmetry 
in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment, and the inequality of expected payoffs between stronger 
and  weaker  players,  inequality  aversion  would  imply  a  diminished  probability  of  entry  by 
stronger players (which we observe in our data). The expected effect of inequality aversion 
would be smaller in the Oracle-Balanced treatment. 
                                                 
14 The problem of boundary equilibrium predictions has been well recognized in linear public good experiments, 
where the Nash equilibrium is to contribute nothing. For a review see Laury and Holt (2008). 16 
 
Finally, it is also possible that some subjects are driven by “joy of winning” (Parco et al. 
2005; Sheremeta, 2010) and/or spite (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). If subjects’ entry decisions 
are driven by joy of winning, then they should be more likely to enter the contest in general.
15 If 
subjects are spiteful, they may  seek to maximize payoff difference by reducing opponents’ 
payoffs (Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004). In the Oracle-Balanced treatment, the only 
way for the stronger player to reduce the weaker player’s payoff is by entering a conflict. On 
the other hand, by design, payoff difference in the Oracle-Unbalanced treatment is already very 
large,  and  thus  the  returns  to  additional  spite  are  likely  to  be  diminished  by  the  already 
substantial inequality of expected payoffs in equilibrium.  
Whether  inequality  aversion,  spite,  joy  of  winning,  or  some  other  factors  produce 
deviations of individual entry decisions from point predictions, the comparative statics of the 
Oracle model hold in our experiment, suggesting that commitment to a random device can 
serve as an effective conflict resolution mechanism. This is encouraging, given that many earlier 
experiments have documented very high costs of conflict (cf. Section 2 above). Indeed, the 
same pattern emerges in our experiment. As we show in the next section, when conflict occurs, 
the costs exceed the predictions of the theory. 
 
                                                 
15 Following Sheremeta (2010), after 30 periods of play, we elicited “joy of winning” by letting subjects make 
expenditures  in  a  conflict  over  a  prize  worth  nothing.  A  novel  feature  of  our  design  is  that  in  the  Oracle-
Unbalanced and Oracle-Balanced treatments, subjects first make entry decisions, and then, upon entry into the 
conflict stage, they choose their expenditure level. Thus, we can test whether joy of winning explains decisions to 
enter the conflict. For that reason, we re-estimated models in Table 4, including joy of winning as an additional 
independent variable. The estimation results are available from the authors upon request. When combining the 
data for both treatments the joy of winning increases the probability of entry. However it appears to affect subject 
types differently in different treatments. For example, there is a positive correlation between joy of winning and 
entry for weaker players in both treatments, but for stronger players the correlation is positive in the Balanced 
treatment and negative in the Unbalanced treatment. Since our experiment was not designed to study the joy of 
winning,  we  are  hesitant  to  draw  any  strong  conclusions.  Future  research  should  carefully  examine  whether 
expenditures for the prize of zero measure the desire to compete or the desire to win, or possibly both. 17 
 
5.3.  Expenditures 
Table 2 reports mean expenditures in excess of the Nash equilibrium predictions for 
both player types in all treatments, and Figure 2, which displays time series of mean individual 
expenditure by role and treatment, also shows that the excess expenditures persist throughout 
the experiment. 
To examine the determinants of expenditures, we combine the data across treatments 
and estimate a single panel regression in which the dependent variable is expenditure and the 
independent variables are a dummy-variable for the weaker player 2, a period trend, a dummy-
variable for the last 15 periods indicating the periods after roles have switched, Unbalanced and 
Oracle  treatment  dummies,  and  a  constant  term.  For  the  Oracle-Balanced  and  Oracle-
Unbalanced treatments we restrict analysis to instances of conflict. As before, we include a 
random effects error structure for the individual subjects to account for repeated measures.  
Table 5 displays the output of this regression. As in the other regressions, the estimated 
coefficients of the period trend and the role-switching dummy are insignificant, suggesting that 
this finding is robust.
16 Consistent with the theory, expenditures decrease as players become 
more  asymmetric  (the  coefficient   on  Unbalanced  is  negative  and  significant),  and  an 
insignificant  coefficient  on  the  Weaker  player  dummy-variable  indicates  no  significant 
differences in expenditures between stronger players 1 and weaker players 2.
17 One might 
expect that the forgone opportunity to avoid the costs of conflict would induce r etaliatory 
                                                 
16 However, if we include a separate period trend for each type, we find that stronger players in the Unbalanced 
treatment reduce their conflict expenditures over time (p-value < 0.01); this suggests that some learning takes 
place regarding the effects of relative strength on win probability.  
17 As a robustness check, we have also re -estimated the regression in Table 5 including interactions between 
Weaker and Unbalanced and between Weaker and Oracle to see whether expenditure of player 1 is different from 
the expenditure of player 2 in the Unbalanced and/or Oracle treatment. Estimation results are very similar and the 
interaction dummies are not significant. 18 
 
behavior by those subjects that chose not to enter but were dragged into conflict by their 
counterpart.  The  insignificant  effect  of  the  Oracle  treatment  on  conflict  expenditures, 
conditional on entry, indicates that conflict intensity remains unchanged in the presence of the 
randomization device.
18 Nevertheless, Wald tests reject the hypotheses that the constant term 
is equal to 24 (the predicted expenditure in the  Balanced treatments) and that the sum of the 
constant and the Unbalanced dummy-variable is equal to 16 (the predicted expenditure in the 
Unbalanced treatments) (p-values < 0.01).
19 We summarize these findings in Result 3. 
Result 3: Although subjects overinvest in conflict on average, expenditures of both types 
are lower when players are more asymmetric. Furthermore, for a given asymmetry level, there 
is no difference in expenditures between stronger and weaker players. 
While our experiment was not designed to test this hypothesis in particular, the data 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, conflict expenditures decline with relative strength asymmetry in 
repeated Tullock contests, and this finding is consistent with a wider literature. For example, in 
animal behavior studies, one common explanation for conflict behavior is based on “fighting 
assessment”  (Parker,  1974).  So-called  “mutual  assessment”  models  hold  that  in  resource 
contests,  animals  assess  the  relative  strength  of  their  opponents,  and upon  recognizing  an 
unfavorable asymmetry they are less likely to expend resources in conflict, thereby reducing 
                                                 
18  As  a  robustness  check  in  the  Oracle-Balanced  and  Oracle-Unbalanced  treatments,  we  have  also  estimated 
regressions controlling for the individual entry decisions in the Oracle stage. Estimation results are virtually the 
same. As another robust check, we also re-estimate the regressions using lag variable of whether players engaged 
in conflict in the past period or not. The effect of the lag is positive, but insignificant, and the other results are 
unchanged except that the estimated period trend is now negative and significant (p-value = 0.03). All estimation 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
19 Prior studies have also found “joy of winning” to be a significant explanation for excess conflict expenditures 
(Parco et al. 2005; Sheremeta 2010; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2010; Mago et al., 2011). We re-estimated Table 5 
including joy of winning as an additional independent variable. The results for the main explanatory variables were 
virtually the same, with the estimated coefficient of joy of winning being positive and significant. 19 
 
the total costs of conflict.
20 Empirical evidence from a broad range of species  shows that the 
average length of resource contests is decreasing in the relative asymmetry of the competitors 
(Arnott and Elwood, 2009). Finally, several recent experimental studies have also documented 
that  increasing  players’  asymmetry  reduces  effort  expenditures  in  diverse  competitive 
environments (Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; DeScioli and Wilson, in press). 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Our model of conflict resolution between asymmetric contestants predicts that when 
players are sufficiently symmetric, they will choose to settle their disputes by appealing to a 
randomization device (the Oracle) in order to avoid the costs of conflict. On the other hand, if 
players are sufficiently asymmetric,  the stronger player  will always choose outright conflict 
because the benefits of conflict exceed the expected value of the random allocation. We test 
the Oracle model in the laboratory with two treatments, one in which the players are relatively 
Balanced and one in which they are Unbalanced. In keeping with previous studies of conflict we 
find evidence that conflicts are generally more costly than expected, as conflict expenditures 
are higher than predicted in all treatments. Also, consistent with previous animal behavior and 
human  subject  research  on  the  intensity  of  conflict  with  respect  to  the  relative  strength 
asymmetry of the contestants, we find that expenditures are greater in the Balanced than in 
the Unbalanced treatments. Most importantly, we find compelling evidence that the Oracle 
reduces the costs of conflict in both treatments: when agents are relatively symmetric, the 
                                                 
20 As the Kenny Rogers lyric famously says, “You gotta know when to hold ‘em, know when to fold ‘em…” 20 
 
Oracle  increases  average  surplus  by  69%,  and  when  they  are  relatively  asymmetric,  it  still 
increases average surplus by 39%.  
Our results highlight the power of commitment to a randomization device as a surplus-
preserving  conflict  resolution  mechanism  and  explain  both  historical  and  modern 
implementations  ranging  from  the  casting  of  lots  and  reading  of  tea  leaves  to  rock-paper-
scissors. Many superficially mystifying practices that appear absurd to modern eyes can be 
revealed to serve similar purposes, and the history of economic and political institutions may 
benefit from studying such mechanisms in this light. 
Both the data and the theory suggest a number of interesting experimental extensions. 
For example, one could explore how much subjects would be willing to pay (in tribute) to 
maintain an Oracle; the theoretical willingness to pay is noted in Section 3, but if there exists a 
threshold for provision of the Oracle as a public good, then the collective action problem may 
reduce the likelihood of surplus preserving solutions. On the other hand, one could ask whether 
various side-payment schemes would increase the willingness of strong players to consent to 
the  randomization  device,  and  if  subjects  can  bargain  over  the  Oracle’s  assignment 
probabilities,  the  observed  surplus  gains  may  be  extended  to  even  more  asymmetric 
environments. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions 
    Treatment 









Strength, ai  1  4  3/2  4  3/2 
  2  1  1  1  1 
Expenditure, ei
*  1  16  24  16  24 
  2  16  24  16  24 
Probability, pi
*  1  0.80  0.60  0.80  0.60 
  2  0.20  0.40  0.20  0.40 
Expected Payoff, E(πi
*)  1  64  36  64  36 
  2  4  16  4  16 












Probability of a Conflict    1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00 
Surplus    68  52  68  100 
 
 
Table 2: Average Statistics 
    Treatment 










*  1  21.4 (0.8)  27.9 (0.8)  17.8 (0.7)  31.8 (1.7) 
  2  23.7 (1.1)  27.2 (0.9)  19.7 (1.2)  28.4 (1.8) 
Probability, pi
*  1  0.77 (0.02)  0.61 (0.02)  0.80 (0.02)  0.64 (0.03) 
  2  0.23 (0.02)  0.39 (0.02)  0.20 (0.02)  0.36 (0.03) 
Expected Payoff, E(πi
*)  1  55.2 (1.7)  33.1 (1.8)  61.7 (2.1)  32.4 (3.1) 
  2  -0.4 (1.6)  11.8 (1.8)  0.8 (1.8)  7.4 (2.9) 












Probability of a Conflict    1.00  1.00  0.63 (0.02)  0.40 (0.02) 
Surplus    54.8 (1.5)  44.9 (1.4)  76.1 (1.2)  75.8 (1.6) 
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
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Table 3: The Impact of the Oracle on Group Surplus 
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable  Surplus 
  Unbalanced  Balanced  Unbalanced  Balanced 
Period  0.502**  -0.082  0.713***  -0.243 
    [period trend]  (0.163)  (0.175)  (0.179)  (0.182) 
Switch  -3.722  5.549  -3.954  4.918 
    [1 if period > 15]  (5.935)  (6.543)  (6.071)  (8.476) 
Oracle  21.31***  30.96***  6.150  -10.41 
    [1 if Oracle]  (5.478)  (5.939)  (5.461)  (8.495) 
Constant  48.91***  43.36***  45.76***  46.18*** 
  (5.231)  (4.815)  (5.467)  (6.739) 
Observations  1320  1380  1090  967 
Number of groups  88  92  86  80 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Panel models (1)-(4) include individual subject random effects.  
Regressions (3) and (4) use only those observations which resulted in conflict. 
 
 
Table 4: Individual Probability of Choosing Conflict 
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3) 





Balanced  Oracle 
Weaker  -2.002***  -1.010***  -1.524*** 
    [1 if player 2]  (0.103)  (0.100)  (0.071) 
Period  0.012  -0.001  0.005 
    [period trend]  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Switch  -0.098  -0.350  -0.232 
    [1 if period > 15]  (0.189)  (0.188)  (0.132) 
Unbalanced      0.600** 
    [1 if Unbalanced]      (0.214) 
Constant  0.156  -0.543**  -0.464** 
  (0.15)  (0.209)  (0.167) 
Observations  1260  1380  2640 
Number of groups  42  46  88 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Panel probit models (1)-(3) include individual subject random effects. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Expenditure 
Regression  (1) 
Dependent Variable  Expenditure 
  All Treatments 
Weaker  0.600 
    [1 if player 2]   (1.450) 
Period  -0.152 
    [period trend]  (0.092) 
Switch  -0.682 
    [1 if period > 15]  (1.879) 
Unbalanced  -7.753** 
    [1 if Unbalanced]  (2.483) 
Oracle  -0.569 
    [1 if Oracle]  (2.502) 
Constant  31.351*** 
  (2.317) 
Observations  4114 
Number of groups  177 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  





Figure 1: Time Series of Mean Probability of Choosing Conflict by Role, Oracle Treatments 
 
   
Figure 2: Time Series of Mean Expenditure by Role and Treatment 28 
 
Appendix – Instructions for the Oracle-Unbalanced Treatment 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, 
you and the other participants in this experiment can earn an appreciable amount of money, which will 
be paid to you in cash. 
  
The currency used in the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _25_ 
francs to _1_ dollar. You have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (this includes the $7 show up 
fee). The experiment will consist of 30 periods and at the end of the experiment we will randomly 
choose 4 of the 30 periods for actual payment. We will sum your total earnings for these 4 periods and 
convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
  
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at others’ decisions (screens). If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. 
If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc..., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect 
and appreciate you following the laboratory's rules. The remainder of the instructions will describe the 
decisions you may face in each period. 
  
The participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. In addition to 
the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group, 
designated as Person 1 or Person 2. You and the other participant in your group will make choices that 
will determine your payoffs. The experiment contains 30 rounds. You will remain within the same two-
person group as the same type for 15 rounds. Thereafter you will be regrouped with another participant 
into a new group where you will be a different type (i.e., if you were Person 1 in the first 15 rounds, you 
will be Person 2 for the last 15 rounds, and vice-versa). 
  
In each round of the experiment either Person 1 or Person 2 will receive the reward. The reward is 
worth 100 francs. Each round of the experiment consists of two decision stages. In Stage 1, you and the 
other person in your group will decide on a specific way to determine who will receive the reward. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 1 
In  each  round,  both  participants  will  have  the  opportunity  to  choose  whether  they  want  to  flip  a 
computer coin in order to determine who will receive the reward. An example of your decision screen is 





If both participants choose to flip a computer coin, the round is over. The flip outcome determines who 
receives the reward. There is a 50% chance the coin lands heads, and 50% chance the coin lands tails. If 
the computer coin lands heads Person 1 receives the reward, if it lands tails, Person 2 receives the 
reward. So, there are two possible payoffs: 
  If You Receive the Reward                                        Earnings  = 100 francs 
  If The Other Person Receives the Reward                    Earnings  = 0 francs 
If you want to flip the coin, check `Yes’. However, if either Person 1 or Person 2 chooses to not flip, by 
checking `No’, then both participants will enter Stage 2. At the end of the experiment we will randomly 
select four out of 30 periods for payment--two from the first 15 periods and two from the last 15 
periods. 
 
YOUR DECISION IN STAGE 2 
If either person chooses to enter stage 2 by checking ‘No’, each person may bid for the 100 franc 
reward. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 100. An example of your decision 




EARNINGS IN STAGE 2 
After both participants make their bids, your earnings for the period are calculated. Regardless of who 
receives the reward, both participants will have to pay their bids. So your earnings will be calculated in 
the following way: 
If you receive the reward:   
Earnings in Stage 2 = 100 – Your Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:   
Earnings in Stage 2 = 0 – Your Bid 
  
Remember you have already earned a $20.00 participation fee (equivalent to 500 francs). In any period, 
you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly 
select four out of 30 periods for payment--two from the first 15 periods and two from the last 15 
periods.  We  will  sum  the  total  earnings  for  these  four  periods  and  convert  them  to  a  U.S.  dollar 
payment. If the summed earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the 
summed earnings are positive, we will add them to your participation fee. 
 
What Does my Bid Mean? 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other person bids, the 
less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically: 
    For each franc Person 1 bids Person 1 receives 8 lottery tickets 
    For each franc Person 2 bids Person 2 receives 2 lottery tickets 
At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 
you and the other person. The owner of the winning ticket receives the reward of 100 francs. Each 
ticket has an equal chance of winning. So your chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of 
tickets you buy divided by the total number of tickets bought by you and the other person. 
 31 
 
Chance of Receiving the Reward = 
Your Total Lottery Tickets 
Sum of Your and Other Person’s Lottery Tickets 
If both participants bid zero the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two participants. 
  
Determining Who Wins The Reward 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer determines who wins the reward of 
100 francs. If Person 1 bids 20 francs and Person 2 bids 20 francs, then Person 1 receives 160 lottery 
tickets and Person 2 receives 40 lottery tickets. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket 
out of 200 (160 + 40). As you can see, Person 1 has a higher chance of receiving the reward, 0.80 = 
160/200. Person 2 has a 0.20 = 40/200 chance of receiving the reward. 
  
After both participants bid, the computer will make a random draw that will determine who receives the 
reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not. At the end of each period, you will see: 
1.     Whether you chose to flip a coin and whether the other person chose to flip a coin, 
2.     If applicable, how much you bid and how much the other person bid, 
3.     Whether you received the reward or not, and 
4.     Your earnings for the period. 
  
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal 




You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which two-person group.  The 
group stays intact for 15 periods.  At the end of 15 periods you will be randomly re-grouped with a 32 
 
different participant to form a new two-person group for another 15 periods.  At the beginning of each 
period you will be told if you are Person 1 or Person 2.  You will be Person 1 in half of the periods and 
Person 2 in half of the periods. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. If both participants choose 
to flip a computer coin in stage 1, then the reward is assigned randomly. If either person chooses not to 
flip a computer coin, then both participants proceed to stage 2. In stage 2, by increasing your bid you 
can increase your chance of receiving the reward. 
 
Quiz 
Before  starting,  we  want  you  to  answer  some  questions  regarding  the  experiment  to  be  sure  you 
understand what will follow. After five minutes an experimenter will return to privately review your 
answers. 
1.  You will be Person 1 in how many of the periods? 
2.  You always have to bid more than zero (true or false)? 
3.  Your bid will be subtracted from your earnings (true or false)? 
4.  If both participants agree to the coin flip, what is the chance of Person 1 winning the reward? 
5.  Imagine Person 1 bids 1 franc and Person 2 bids 1 franc.  What is the chance of Person 1 winning 
the reward? 
6.  Imagine Person 1 bids 2 francs and Person 2 bids 8 francs.  What is the chance of Person 1 
winning the reward? 
7.  Imagine Person 1 bids 8 francs and Person 2 bids 16 francs.  What is the chance of Person 1 
winning the reward? 
8.  Imagine Person 1 bids 18 francs and Person 2 bids 24 francs.  What is the chance of Person 1 
winning the reward? 
9.  Imagine Person 1 bids 18 francs and Person 2 bids 72 francs.  What is the chance of Person 1 
winning the reward? 
10. Imagine Person 1 bids 0 francs and Person 2 bids 1 franc.  What is the chance of Person 1 
winning the reward? 
 
The following instructions handed out and read aloud after subjects participated in the prior experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART II 
This part of the experiment consists of only one decision-making period and only one stage. The rules 
for this part are similar to the rules for part I.  Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _25_ 
francs to _1_ dollar.  Participants will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. In addition to the 
group  assignment  each  participant  will  also  be  randomly  assigned  to  a  specific  type  in  the  group, 
designated as Person 1 or Person 2.  
  
You will bid in order to be a winner. The only difference is that in this part the winner receives a reward 
of zero. The reward is worth 0 francs to you and the other person in your group.  After everyone have 
made their decisions your earnings for the period are calculated: 
  
Earnings = 0 – Your Bid 
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The more you bid, the more likely you are to be the winner.  The more the other person in your group 
bids, the less likely you are to be the winner.  Specifically: 
    For each franc Person 1 bids Person 1 receives 8 lottery tickets 
    For each franc Person 2 bids Person 2 receives 2 lottery tickets 
  
After both participants submit their bids, the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets 
purchased by you and the other person. Each ticket has an equal chance of winning.  So your chance of 
being the winner is given by the number of tickets you buy divided by the total number of tickets bought 
by you and the other person in your group. 
  
Chance of Being the Winner=Your Total Lottery Tickets divided by the Sum of Your and Other Person’s 
Lottery Tickets 
  
If both people bid zero, the designation of winner is randomly assigned to one of the two people in the 
group. 
  
After everyone has made his or her decision, you will learn whether you win or not. The computer then 
will display your earnings on the outcome screen.  Both people will have to pay their bids.  Your earnings 
will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment.  
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